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Abstract
Buyers typically do not read the …ne print in contracts, providing an incentive for
a monopolist to draft terms which are unfavorable to buyers. We model this problem,
proving that trade must then be ine¢cient. We show that regulation which mandates
e¢cient terms raises welfare. More interestingly, regulations which prohibit the least
e¢cient terms may reduce welfare by inducing the monopolist not to o¤er favorable
terms. We extend these results to markets in which some buyers are naive, showing
that prohibiting the least e¢cient terms may also harm the naive buyers.
1. Introduction
According to some estimates, over 99% of commercial contracts are standard form: one
party drafts a contract which the other party can only accept or reject (cf. Zamir (2014)).
Standard form contracts are often complex, and are written in …ne print or jargon; so
buyers rarely read their non-price terms. Drafters of contracts may therefore have an
incentive to include terms which exploit buyers and, potentially, result in ine¢cient trade.
Accordingly, economists and contract lawyers have long advocated regulation of the terms
in complex contracts by treating some terms as unenforceable. This paper explores the
e¤ect of such policies in a model where complexity is endogenous, and unregulated trade
is indeed ine¢cient.
In our main model, an unregulated monopolist drafts a contract (for trade in a good),
which might be either simple or complex. A simple contract speci…es a price for the good,
which buyers observe, and default terms (such as warranty coverage) which are commonly
known, perhaps because they describe conventional commercial practice. In particular,
simple contracts do not contain any …ne print. On the other hand, the monopolist can
only change these default terms by drafting a complex contract. Speci…cally, a complex
contract speci…es a price for the good - which buyers observe - and non-price terms, which
buyers can read at a (socially wasteful) cost. In other words, non-price terms are written
in …ne print. These terms may be more favorable or less favorable for buyers than default
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terms. The monopolist has the opposite incentives: it is cheaper to produce, the less
favorable are terms. We assume that it is socially e¢cient for trade to occur in (complex)
contracts which include terms which are more favorable to buyers than default terms: so
complex contracts, with requisite …ne print, may play a socially valuable role. Buyers
observe whether the contract on o¤er is simple or complex (e.g. via its length). In the
former case, they decide whether to accept or to reject; in the latter case, they may also
choose to read before accepting or rejecting.
Trade with an unregulated monopolist must then be ine¢cient in every Bayes perfect
equilibrium (henceforth BPE) because the monopolist cannot commit to drafting favorable
terms. As a result, welfare is reduced for two reasons: buyers would only read a complex
contract if the monopolist mixed over terms, sometimes o¤ering contracts which contain
unfavorable terms; and the monopolist would only o¤er a favorable contract if buyers
sometimes read complex contracts.
This game has many BPEs because buyers may infer that any complex contract which
is not o¤ered on the path of a putative BPE contains unfavorable terms. These inferences
seem unduly adverse; so we introduce a re…nement which selects the BPE with the highest
expected pro…t. This BPE takes one out of two possible forms. If reading is costly enough
then the monopolist o¤ers either a simple or an unfavorable contract; otherwise, she mixes
between o¤ering a favorable and an unfavorable contract (at the same price), while buyers
mix between reading the contract and accepting without reading, earning their reservation
value. These predictions are consistent with evidence that buyers rarely read (cf. Bakos et
al (2014)), and that terms in complex contracts are not uniformly unfavorable (cf. Mann
and Siebeneicher (2008) and Marotta-Wurgler (2008)). Furthermore, our ine¢ciency result
provides a reason why policy makers might intervene in unregulated markets.
We consider the e¤ects of two sorts of regulation: mandating favorable terms (hence-
forth mandating regulation) and prohibiting unfavorable terms (henceforth mitigating reg-
ulation). Trade under mandating regulation is e¢cient; and the outcome Pareto-dominates
that in unregulated markets, all gains accruing to the monopolist. The intuition is that
this regulation solves the monopolist’s commitment problem: buyers know that complex
contracts must be favorable; so the monopolist can raise price to buyers’ (common) reser-
vation value.
While mandating favorable terms would ensure e¢ciency, identifying e¢cient terms
may be beyond the capacity of regulators - which is arguably why mitigating regulation
is more common. Mitigating regulation prevents the monopolist drafting some ine¢cient
terms; so it is surprising that such regulation may reduce welfare when an unregulated
monopolist sometimes o¤ers a favorable contract. The intuition is that such regulations
modify rather than eliminate the monopolist’s commitment problem. Consequently, the
monopolist can still only o¤er complex contracts if buyers are prepared to read; and
prohibiting unfavorable terms reduces buyers’ incentives to read by lowering the utility
di¤erence between the best and worst possible terms. Mitigating regulation may therefore
reduce welfare by inducing the monopolist not to o¤er any favorable contracts.
Following the literature, we extend our main model by introducing some naive buyers,
dubbing the other buyers as sophisticated. In light of the heterogeneity of buyers, we also
suppose that the monopolist can o¤er a menu of contracts (though she cannot tell which
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buyer is naive).
We follow the literature by supposing that naive buyers are overoptimistic: they believe
that every complex contract contains favorable terms, and therefore never read. We focus
on cases where few enough buyers are naive (among other conditions). If reading is cheap
enough and few enough buyers are naive then an unregulated monopolist o¤ers complex
contracts at two prices. The higher priced contract is favorable with positive probability
and otherwise unfavorable, and is only accepted by sophisticated buyers; the cheaper
contract is always unfavorable, and is accepted by naive buyers, who wrongly believe
it to be favorable. The monopolist thereby discriminates between buyers, trading an
unfavorable contract with naive buyers. Naive and sophisticated buyers separate, but
both trade a complex contract; so the monopolist cannot charge naive buyers more than
sophisticated buyers for a complex contract. Sophisticated buyers therefore protect naive
buyers, even though the monopolist o¤ers a menu of contracts. Mandating regulation
again raises welfare, and now strictly bene…ts naive buyers as well as the monopolist.
By contrast, mitigating regulation may harm naive buyers by reducing the monopolist’s
incentive to o¤er favorable contracts to sophisticated buyers (for the same reasons as in
our main model), and may therefore eliminate the protection which they provide naive
buyers in unregulated markets.
Related literature
The issues which we address are related to the large literature on quality competition
with sophisticated buyers. More directly, various papers incorporate a cost of reading terms
which are drafted by one of the parties to the contract.1 In Katz (1990), there is an interval
of feasible non-price terms, which depends on the legal regime, but no simple contract.
(Simple contracts do not appear in the other papers discussed below.) A monopolist
chooses a directly observable price and non-price terms which can be read at a cost, as
in our model. Divisibility of all terms implies that the monopolist never mixes; she o¤ers
the most unfavorable terms that the legal regime allows, setting price such that a buyer
who reads is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting. This outcome is also possible
in our model if unfavorable contracts yield a greater social surplus than simple contracts
and reading is costly enough; but it is inconsistent with evidence that …ne print terms are
typically not as unfavorable as possible. If reading is not too costly then our model (with
a …nite number of feasible non-price terms) predicts that the monopolist would o¤er a
favorable contract with positive probability, setting price such that buyers are indi¤erent
between reading, accepting without reading, and rejecting. Katz shows that mandating
regulation induces an e¢cient outcome, as in our model. However, smaller improvements
in the most unfavorable possible terms raises welfare in his model, whereas mitigating
regulation may reduce welfare in our model.
There is a …nite number of possible terms in Rasmusen’s (2001) two-player model, so
the non-drafting party mixes between accepting and reading any complex contract, as in
our model. Rasmusen assumes that it is costly to read every clause, so price cannot signal
non-price terms. This feature plays an important role in our characterization of equilibria.
In Che and Choi (2009), competitive sellers can incur a cost to partially disclose whether
terms are favorable or unfavorable; and buyers, who directly observe price, can either
1Hermalin et al’s (2007) survey of the law and economics of contracts discusses these and related issues.
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accept or read (at a cost), and can resample sellers if they reject. In any equilibrium, as in
our model, buyers who read are indi¤erent between accepting and reading. Furthermore,
sellers separate into those o¤ering favorable terms with high probability and not disclosing,
and those who are sure to o¤er unfavorable terms and disclose.
There is typically a range of BPEs in Che and Choi, as in our model. Che and Choi
select the BPE which maximizes welfare rather than pro…t. Nevertheless, the two criteria
select the same BPE in our main model because our re…nement implies that buyers earn
their reservation value.
In contrast to Che and Choi, we do not allow the monopolist to disclose non-price
terms. However, if mandatory disclosure were possible in our model then a regulated
monopolist would o¤er a favorable contract, priced at the reservation value; and regulated
trade would be e¢cient. This is not true in Che and Choi because they assume that sellers
must o¤er a single contract to buyers with heterogeneous valuations.
This paper, like Katz (1990), Che and Choi (2009) and Rasmusen (2001), is related
to the literature on auditing/inspection games, as surveyed by Avenhaus et al (2002) and
Avenhaus and Canty (2009). Our results on unregulated trade reproduce a fundamental
property of inspection games with a …nite number of feasible terms: favorable contracts
can only be o¤ered in equilibrium if buyers and seller(s) monitor each other by mixing:
sometimes o¤ering unfavorable contracts and sometimes reading.
The papers hitherto surveyed assume that all buyers are sophisticated, as in our main
model. A related literature, starting with Gabaix and Laibson (2006), considers compet-
itive markets in which some buyers are naively optimistic.2 Gabaix and Laibson assume
that all buyers acquire a base product from a seller after observing her price, and may
either acquire an add-on or (ine¢ciently) incur a substitution cost. Sellers can choose any
scalar price for the base product and for the add-on, and whether to o¤er a shrouded or an
unshrouded contract. The literature focuses on this decision; we preclude such a decision
by supposing that the complexity of a given contract is determined by its content (viz.
whether it amends default terms).
Conditional on sellers choosing to shroud, the models share several important features,
but di¤er in other respects. First, the opportunity to substitute away allows buyers to avoid
unfavorable add-on terms, like our reading cost; though in Gabaix and Laibson, buyers can
accept the base product alone, whereas buyers in our model can only avoid an unfavorable
contract by rejecting. Conditional on sellers choosing to shroud, trade would be ine¢cient
in Gabaix and Laibson for reasons akin to the ine¢ciency in our model and in Katz (1990):
sellers would choose the most unfavorable price for the add-on, inducing sophisticated
buyers to substitute away. Second, Gabaix and Laibson allow buyers to be sophisticated
(in our sense) or to believe that the add-on is free (as in our model with naive buyers).
Sellers compete by cutting the base product price; so exploitation of naive buyers bene…ts
sophisticated buyers. This form of cross-subsidization is impossible in our model because
the monopolist uses her menu to screen buyers in equilibrium. Indeed, sophisticated buyers
protect (few enough) naive buyers in our model. This form of protection is also absent in
Schwartz and Wilde’s (1983) price search model, where sellers must o¤er the same terms
to all buyers.
2This literature has recently been surveyed by Koszegi (2014) Section 6.1 and by Huck and Zhou (2011).
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Heidhues et al (2014) Section 4.2 builds on Gabaix and Laibson (2006) by assuming
that sellers o¤er a menu of products (rather than of contracts), each bundling the base
product and the add-on.3 Heidhues et al show that trade is e¢cient if enough buyers are
sophisticated (contrary to our results), and that sellers use the menu to separate buyers,
as in our model. In equilibrium, naive buyers are not protected because they recognize
that sophisticated buyers acquire a di¤erent product;4 whereas, protection occurs in our
model because naive buyers believe that the complex contracts on o¤er contain the same
terms. Heidhues et al also show that reducing the maximal feasible price of the add-on
increases welfare (as in Katz (1990)); whereas, mitigating regulation may reduce welfare
in our model.
Our results are related to the literature on regulation, particularly to the study of what
Armstrong and Sappington (2007) call “practical regulatory policies”: the comparison of
simple regulatory policies, such as price caps and disclosure.5 Imposing price caps on
overdrafts in Armstrong and Vickers (2012) plays a similar role to regulations in our model.
Stringent enough price caps are equivalent to mandating favorable terms in our model, and
must raise welfare. Armstrong and Vickers note that the welfare e¤ect of less stringent caps
is ambiguous. However, this ambiguity turns on whether naive and sophisticated buyers
cross-subsidize each other; whereas mitigating regulation could raise or lower welfare in
our model when all buyers are sophisticated. Our result is also reminiscent of Armstrong
et al’s (2009) price search model: imposing a price cap reduces buyers’ incentive to become
informed (read) in competitive markets, and might therefore make all buyers worse o¤.
More generally, our results on mitigating regulation have a second best ‡avor: moving
regulations part way to the ideal rule may be worse than no regulation because agents’
equilibrium response induces a convex relation between regulatory policy and welfare.
We present our model of unregulated monopoly in Section 2, characterizing trade in
unregulated and regulated markets in Section 3. We extend our analysis to markets in
which some buyers are naive in Section 4, and summarize in Section 5. Longer proofs
are in an Appendix; we detail some arguments used in Section 4 in an online appendix:
D’Agostino and Seidmann (2016).
2. Unregulated trade
In this section, we de…ne a game representing play in an unregulated monopoly.
The game is played by a monopolist (she) and a unit mass of buyers (he). Players can
trade a good which is indivisible in consumption. The monopolist o¤ers a contract; each
3Sophisticated buyers observe both prices, unlike our model and Gabaix and Laibson (2006).
4This property holds in a number of related models in which sellers o¤er a menu of products: Eliaz and
Spiegler (2006) [resp. (2008)] demonstrate that a monopolist’s optimal menu induces time-inconsistent
[resp. over-optimistic] and sophisticated buyers to separate: the former are not protected by the lat-
ter in equilibrium; Heidhues and Koszegi (2010) obtain similar results for time-inconsistent buyers and
competitive sellers.
5See, for example, Armstrong et al (2009) on price caps, Korobkin (2003) on treating unfavorable terms
as unconscionable, and Ayres and Schwartz (2014) on disclosure regulation. Koszegi (2014) Section 6.2
surveys this literature.
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buyer then decides whether to accept, to reject or to read before accepting or rejecting.
The game then ends.
We now describe the game in detail:
Contracts
Contracts determine both the price at which trade takes place and some other (non-
price) terms of trade. We suppose that a contract is either simple or complex. A simple
contract contains a single clause, which speci…es the price charged (denoted ), but leaves
non-price terms unspeci…ed. We suppose that trade is then governed by default terms,
which are commonly known by all players. Default terms might be those which courts
enforce, absent amendment. They might also represent common commercial practice,
which triggers reasonable expectations by buyers.6
A complex contract contains two clauses: the …rst clause speci…es the price charged;
the second clause speci…es non-price terms, which might either be favorable, unfavorable
or default. (Default terms repeat those implicit in a simple contract.) We will refer to
complex contracts with favorable, default and unfavorable terms as favorable, default and
unfavorable contracts, respectively.
Non-price terms might specify, for example, the extent of a warranty, delivery costs,
the number of permissible users, the availability of class relief, or a dispute resolution
procedure. In each case, all buyers share the same ranking over terms. In particular,
terms are favorable [resp. unfavorable] if they are better [resp. worse] for buyers than
default terms. This distinction corresponds to Marotta-Wurgler’s (2008) procedure for
classifying software licenses: where default terms are those speci…ed in Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, while favorable [resp. unfavorable] terms are more [resp. less]
buyer-friendly.7
Our distinction between simple and complex contracts implies that the monopolist can
only propose a non-default term by o¤ering a complex contract. We view this property as
a key feature of …ne print models. It will play a crucial role in our analysis.
Some notation will prove useful: we write f g, f g and f g respectively for
favorable, default and unfavorable contracts, each priced at . We write  for f  g:
the set of possible terms.
Buyers
We model the problem of complexity by supposing that buyers observe both the …rst
clause of each contract on o¤er (the price) and whether it is simple or complex, but not
the content of any second clause. If the contract is simple then the buyer, knowing its
(default) terms, either accepts or rejects. If the contract is complex then the buyer can
either accept the contract without reading, reject the o¤er without reading, or read the
second clause and then decide whether to accept or reject.
A buyer receives a return of 0 if he does not consume, and of  ¡  if he buys a good
priced at  with terms  2  . We also assume that a buyer incurs a sunk cost, denoted
by   0, if he decides to read the second clause of a complex contract. This cost could
6According to the 2014 UK Consumer Rights Act, contract terms are only unfair if they would surprise
a buyer whose expectations are reasonable.
7Similarly, Schwarcz (2011) considers whether terms in home insurance contracts are either more or
less favorable than those in the Insurance Services O¢ce’s boilerplate = the default.
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represent the time taken to read a lengthy document or be incurred by hiring an expert
to interpret jargon. A buyer’s payo¤ is his return minus any reading cost incurred.
Monopolist
The monopolist starts the game by deciding which contract to o¤er, where price  can
take any scalar value.
If a buyer accepts a contract then the monopolist receives a revenue equal to the
contractual price, and incurs a constant production cost, plus a drafting cost if her contract
is complex. The drafting cost is positive, but less than  ¡ . We write  [resp. ]
for the total cost incurred when a favorable [rep. unfavorable] contract is accepted. It
is notationally convenient to write  for the (production) cost incurred when a simple
contract is accepted. As default contracts are complex, trading them costs  plus the
drafting cost. We will subsequently argue that an unregulated monopolist never o¤ers a
default contract (because of the drafting cost). The monopolist earns 0 when a buyer does
not accept. Her payo¤ is the integral of the pro…t which she earns across all buyers.
Game
We denote the game described above by , and refer to it as the unregulated game. We
will focus on games in which the various parameters are generic. This restriction primarily
excludes cases in which  ¡  =  ¡ , and in which  = 4.8
Equilibria
We will analyze  by characterizing a subset of its Bayes-perfect equilibria, where a
buyer’s belief assigns a probability distribution over the terms in a complex contract priced
at : for every  2 <.9 We denote the associated strategy combination and buyer beliefs as
a BPE, describing a BPE in which the monopolist o¤ers a simple [resp. complex] contract
for sure as a simple [resp. complex ] BPE. We will refer to the payo¤ vector in a BPE as
a BPE outcome.
One might intuitively expect that the monopolist would be able to exert market power
because she alone can draft contracts. However, this is not true of all BPEs. Roughly
speaking, the monopolist may be deterred from charging higher prices for a complex con-
tract in some BPEs because buyers believe that terms are then unfavorable. These BPEs
arguably rely on buyers threatening to hold implausible beliefs about the terms in complex
contracts which are not o¤ered on the BPE path.
We explore the intuition that the monopolist’s ideal BPE is played, using a re…nement
in the spirit of Fudenberg and Levine (1989).10 It is expositionally convenient to provide
a formal de…nition of the re…nement here, and to defer a more detailed explanation to a
Remark at the end of Section 3.1 (following our main use of the re…nement in Proposition
3.1).
For any game , we de…ne a class of perturbed games ( ) in which the monopolist
is an -commitment type with probability   0 and a normal type otherwise. Normal
types have the same preferences as the monopolist in ; an -commitment type’s play is
8The reasons why such nongeneric cases would complicate exposition will become clear below.
9The strategy combination in a Bayes-perfect equilibrium forms a Bayesian equilibrium after every
move, given posterior beliefs which satisfy Bayes rule on the path, and the rules of the game elsewhere.
10While the details di¤er, Fudenberg and Levine motivate their approach as providing foundations for
exactly this intuition (p.799).
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de…ned in terms of the supremum of monopoly payo¤s across BPEs of , say ¤. If 
has a BPE in which the monopolist earns ¤ ¡  for some   0 then an -commitment
type in ( ) plays her (possibly mixed) strategy in some such BPE; otherwise, the -
commitment type in ( ) plays the monopolist’s strategy in a BPE of  where she earns
¤. Given this de…nition, we can characterize the BPEs of any perturbed game ( ),
denoting the (mixed) strategy played by buyers and the normal type of the monopolist in
a BPE of ( ) by ( ). We say that beliefs plus a strategy combination  in  are
an -equilibrium of  if they are a BPE of  and if some sequence of perturbed games
f( )g have BPEs with strategy combinations f( )g which converge to  as  ! 0.
We say that  is an equilibrium strategy combination of  if it is the limit of some sequence
of -equilibrium strategy combinations of  as  converges to 0. An outcome is the payo¤
vector at some equilibrium of .
On one interpretation, our use of the re…nement means that our model implicitly
represents play in a repeated game. The monopolist then has market power because she is
a long-run player. This interpretation is arguably appropriate when modelling …ne print
problems (cf. Bebchuk and Posner (2006)). However, we prefer to view the re…nement as
a way to preclude implausible beliefs, even if play is not repeated.
E¢ciency
We will characterize equilibria of unregulated games which satisfy two assumptions on
the bene…ts and costs of alternative terms. The …rst assumption states that buyers and
sellers have con‡icting interests over possible non-price terms:
A1: Con‡icting interests
     and      .¥
A1 seems natural in the context of our examples above of non-price terms.
The second assumption imposes conditions on how the social surplus from trade varies
with the terms:
A2: E¢cient favorable terms
 ¡   maxf ¡   ¡ g  0.¥
We will refer to aggregate payo¤ (across the monopolist and buyers) as welfare. A2
implies that welfare is maximized when the monopolist trades favorable contracts with
buyers who do not read.
A2 is, of course, empirically restrictive. We will return to the role that it plays in our
analysis after Proposition 3.1 in Section 3.1.
We will henceforth normalize bene…ts and costs by setting  = 0 (so  could be
negative).
We will refer to arg 6= max  ¡  as the second best terms, and a contract which only
contains the second best terms as a second best contract. (If default terms are second best
then the second best contract is simple.) We will use subscript 2 to denote the bene…t and
cost of second best terms.
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3. Results
In Section 3.1, we characterize equilibrium play in unregulated games. In Section 3.2,
we de…ne games in which the monopolist is regulated, characterize their equilibria, and
compare outcomes with those in the unregulated game.
3.1. Unregulated games
Our …rst result provides grounds for considering regulation:
Lemma 1 Trade is ine¢cient in every BPE.
Proof E¢ciency requires all trade to be in favorable contracts (cf. A2), and for no
buyer to read. If the monopolist anticipated that a buyer would accept a favorable contract
(without reading) then the monopolist could pro…tably deviate to o¤ering an unfavorable
contract at the same price. Consequently, every BPE is ine¢cient.¥
Drafters know the terms in complex contracts; whereas buyers must incur a socially
wasteful cost to observe them directly. Lemma 1 asserts that this asymmetry of information
must result in ine¢cient trade. We will explain this ine¢ciency in terms of commitment
after Proposition 3.1 below.
Our next result describes necessary conditions for the monopolist to o¤er a favorable
contract in a BPE:
Lemma 2
a The monopolist does not o¤er a (complex) default contract in any BPE.
b Any BPE in which the monopolist o¤ers a favorable contract with positive probability
has the following properties: the monopolist also o¤ers an unfavorable contract at the
same price as the favorable contract with positive probability; and buyers mix between
accepting and reading a complex contract at that price, only accepting after reading
favorable terms in the latter case.
In light of Lemma 2, we will henceforth refer to any BPEs in which the monopolist
o¤ers favorable contracts as semi-favorable.
We prove Lemma 2 in the Appendix. The argument for part a is that buyers must
sometimes read, else the monopolist could pro…tably deviate to o¤ering an unfavorable
contract; and that buyers would only read if the monopolist sometimes o¤ered a complex
contract which was not favorable at the same price. Such a contract could not be default
because the monopolist could then pro…tably deviate to o¤ering a simple contract.
We will need some notation before stating our next result, which characterizes equilib-
ria. We de…ne  as
q
1¡ 4

and b as 2
1¡ . It is easy to con…rm that b   whenever 
is well-de…ned.
Proposition 3.1 (Unregulated games)
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Generic unregulated games have a unique equilibrium outcome, which is ine¢cient, and
at which buyers expect to earn 0. The monopolist mixes between o¤ering an unfavorable
and a favorable contract, each priced at b, if and only if   4 and
2  2 ¡ 2 +  or   (2 ¡ 2 + )
2
2 ¡ 2 +  ¡  . (1)
The monopolist otherwise o¤ers a second best contract, priced at 2.
We prove Proposition 3.1 in the Appendix. Lemma 1 immediately implies that every
equilibrium must be ine¢cient. The remainder of the proof uses the following steps. We
…rst demonstrate that a second best BPE in which the monopolist charges 2 always exists,
and that any other BPE is semi-favorable. We then prove that a semi-favorable BPE in
which the monopolist charges b exists if and only if the conditions in the premise hold: in
other words, that the monopolist and buyers mutually discipline each other (cf. Lemma
2a).   4 ensures that buyers sometimes read: the left-hand side should be read as
the utility di¤erence between accepting favorable and unfavorable contracts. The two
conditions in (1) ensure that the monopolist cannot pro…tably deviate to o¤ering a second
best contract: the …rst condition bounds above the pro…t from such a contract (2 ¡ 2);
the second condition bounds the BPE pro…t (b ¡ ) below because b is an increasing
function of  . We also note that   4 and (1) are necessary for any semi-favorable
BPE to exist, and that the monopolist then earns most (across BPEs) when she chargesb for a complex contract.
We end the proof by showing that the game has a unique equilibrium outcome. If
  4 and (1) then every semi-favorable BPE in which the monopolist charges b is
an equilibrium; and no other BPE survives the re…nement because the monopolist could
pro…tably deviate to o¤ering complex contracts priced just below b in perturbed games. In
particular, our re…nement captures the intuition that semi-favorable BPEs at prices belowb rely on implausible buyer inferences. On the other hand, every BPE is second best if
the conditions in the premise fail; so the unique outcome is second best.
The price charged in a semi-favorable equilibrium approaches  as  ! 0 (by l’Hopital’s
rule); and the probability that terms are then favorable (viz. (1 +  )2) approaches 1 as
 ! 0. Furthermore, A2 implies that   2 ¡ 2 +  ; so   maxf4 (2¡2+ )
2
2¡2+¡g
when  is small enough. Proposition 3.1 therefore implies that the monopolist must o¤er
complex contracts, which are almost sure to be favorable, at a price close to  when
reading is almost costless. This property seems natural: for if reading were costless then
the monopolist would o¤er a favorable contract, priced at  , in equilibrium.
This argument seems to underlie the claim that a monopolist would raise price rather
than include unfavorable terms (cf. Rako¤ (1983) and Baird (2000)): so trade in unreg-
ulated markets is e¢cient. This argument does not hold in our model, where reading
is costly. Buyers must then ine¢ciently read in any semi-favorable equilibrium because
the monopolist cannot commit to o¤ering favorable contracts. Viewed in this light, the
Baird-Rako¤ argument implicitly supposes that a monopolist who charges more can com-
mit to favorable terms. In the next subsection, we will explain how appropriately designed
regulation eliminates the commitment problem and ensures e¢ciency.
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Proposition 3.1 is consistent with the evidence that terms are typically not unfavorable
(cf. Mann and Siebeneicher (2008) and Marotta-Wurgler (2008)), and that buyers rarely
read standard form contracts (cf. Bakos et al (2014)). The probability that complex
contracts are favorable equals (1+
q
1¡ 4

)2; while buyers read a complex contract with
probability ( ¡ )(b ¡ ), where b does not depend on the cost parameters. Hence,
terms are usually favorable and buyers rarely read if 4 is large and  is close to .
Proposition 3.1 relies on A2. If trade in simple [resp. unfavorable] contracts maximized
social surplus then the monopolist would o¤er a simple [resp. unfavorable] contract, priced
at  [resp. 0] in every BPE; so unregulated trade would be e¢cient.
Remark (Re…nement)
Our re…nement di¤ers from that introduced by Fudenberg and Levine (1989) via our
de…nition of an -commitment type. They consider perturbed games in which some player
is a normal or a commitment type. The normal type has the same preferences as that player
in the original game; the commitment type always chooses the player’s stage Stackelberg
pure strategy. Fudenberg and Levine select a BPE of the original game which is the limit
of BPEs of perturbed games as the prior probability that the player is normal approaches
1.11
In our model, the monopolist’s Stackelberg strategy is to o¤er a favorable contract
priced at  . The normal type would not pool with such a commitment type in any BPE
of a perturbed game because buyers would have to accept, and the normal type could
then pro…tably deviate to o¤ering an unfavorable contract at price  . In other words,
the ensuing re…nement would have no power. Furthermore, introducing a commitment
type who is sure to play the mixed strategy in the best complex BPE for the monopolist
would not exclude second best BPEs because buyers could not improve on rejecting the
commitment type’s o¤er. Our re…nement has power because an -commitment type o¤ers
a contract which buyers strictly prefer over rejecting.
Our re…nement selects the BPE which maximizes welfare across BPEs because buyers
expect to earn 0 in every BPE and because pro…t in a semi-favorable BPE increases with
price, and exceeds pro…t in the second best BPE. The intuition is that a monopolist who
charges a higher price is more likely to o¤er a favorable contract, and that buyers are
consequently more likely to accept, thereby economizing on socially wasteful reading.
3.2. Regulated markets
Proposition 3.1 provides a possible reason why trade in standard form contracts might
be regulated: that unregulated trade is ine¢cient because one-sided drafting creates an
informational asymmetry. Speci…cally, if buyers observed contract terms (or reading were
costless) then the monopolist would o¤er a favorable contract, and trade would be e¢cient.
Ine¢ciency might therefore be avoided by mandating disclosure. Unfortunately, forcing
sellers to display unfavorable terms does not translate into informing buyers, particularly
in settings where …ne print is an issue: that is, reading any disclosure is costly. Recent
11Mailath and Samuelson (2006) Ch.15 discuss Fudenberg and Levine’s re…nement; Ch.18 considers the
consequences of alternative commitment types.
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evidence casts doubt on the e¢cacy of mandatory disclosure in such settings.12
The natural alternative to disclosure rules is regulation which renders some possible
terms unenforceable. Despite the general principle that parties are free to negotiate con-
tracts, courts, legislatures and regulators have sometimes over-ruled unfavorable terms
in standard form contracts. Eisenberg (2009) traces court activism to the 1960s - par-
ticularly to §2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which allowed courts to declare
unconscionable terms unenforceable. This section was widely incorporated into state law,
and was reformulated in §208 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts.13
In this subsection, we will use Proposition 3.1 to consider the welfare e¤ects of reg-
ulations which mandate favorable terms or prohibit unfavorable terms, but do not ad-
dress (upfront = …rst clause) prices.14 We will focus on the ex ante e¤ects of regulation:
that is, how regulations (or precedents) change the contracts which a monopolist o¤ers.
By contrast, fact-…nding courts resolve ex post disputes: viz. conditional on an existing
agreement. As we note below, this distinction only matters in our model when we consider
regulations which prohibit unfavorable terms.
3.2.1. Mandating regulation
We start by considering the e¤ects of regulations which mandate favorable terms but allow
the monopolist to choose her price. We will refer to such a policy as mandating regulation,
and the associated game as a mandating regulation game. The di¤erence between these
games and those presented in Section 2 is that the monopolist is constrained to o¤er a
favorable contract.15 We will use the same solution concept (equilibrium) to characterize
play under mandating regulation:
Lemma 3 If favorable terms are mandated then the monopolist charges  and earns
 ¡  , whereas buyers earn 0. Trade is then e¢cient.
We can now use Proposition 3.1 and Lemma 3 to characterize the welfare e¤ects of
mandating favorable terms, again omitting the obvious proof:
Proposition 3.2 (Mandating regulation raises welfare) The outcome in mandating
regulation games Pareto dominates the outcome in unregulated games.
Every equilibrium outcome in an unregulated market is ine¢cient because buyers must
sometimes read for sellers to o¤er favorable contracts; and the monopolist must sometimes
o¤er unfavorable contracts to ensure that buyers read. Mandating favorable terms directly
disciplines the monopolist, allowing buyers to accept complex contracts without reading.
12Ben-Shahar and Schneider (2014) and Ayres and Schwartz (2014) discuss this evidence.
13In the UK, the 2014 Consumer Rights Act deems …ne print terms unfair if they violate good faith
requirements and are detrimental enough to buyers.
14Courts could …nd price unconscionable, but have been very reluctant to do so (cf. White and Sum-
mers (2010) §5-5 and 5-7). Paragraph 5.1 of the UK Consumer Rights Act exempts upfront prices from
considerations of fairness.
15A2 implies that the same results apply to regulations which require that any complex contract be
favorable, but allow the monopolist to o¤er simple contracts.
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While mandating regulation raises ex ante welfare, the monopoly is the sole bene…ciary
because buyers expect to earn 0 in both cases. This property is quite striking because the
case for regulation in the related literature and court decisions has been that it protects
buyers.
Proposition 3.2 explains why a regulator (with an ex ante perspective) would man-
date favorable terms. The same policy is optimal for courts: A2 implies that replacing
unfavorable or default terms in accepted contracts also raises welfare.
3.2.2. Mitigating regulation
We now turn to regulations which mitigate terms solely by prohibiting unfavorable con-
tracts or making unfavorable terms unenforceable. We will refer to these as mitigating
regulations. Regulations of this sort are instanced by restrictions on the use of mortgage
prepayment penalties in the 1994 Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act.
Proposition 3.2 implies that regulators could achieve e¢ciency (in our model) by man-
dating favorable terms; but courts and regulators seem much more prone to prohibit
unfavorable terms for at least two reasons. First, legal doctrine allows courts to replace
unconscionable terms; whereas, mandating favorable terms may con‡ict with the doc-
trine that courts should intervene minimally.16 Second, identifying e¢cient terms may be
unduly demanding for courts and regulators.
In this part, we consider the ex ante e¤ects of regulations which prohibit unfavorable
contracts. Speci…cally, we model a regulated market as a game in which the monopolist
can o¤er a simple contract or a complex contract containing either favorable or default
terms. Aside from this amendment, the game corresponds to that de…ned in Section 2.
We call it a mitigating regulation game.
Despite the formal similarity between unregulated and mitigating regulation games,
equilibrium play di¤ers in one important respect. An unregulated monopolist would never
o¤er default terms in a complex contract because she would earn more by o¤ering an
unfavorable contract were buyers to reject after reading default terms, and would otherwise
earn more by o¤ering a simple contract (cf. the proof of Lemma 2a). This argument does
not apply if the monopolist is prohibited from o¤ering unfavorable contracts. As the
monopolist is better o¤ with default terms when buyers accept without reading, there
may then be equilibria in which she o¤ers a complex contract with default terms (a default
contract) and charges more than .
This di¤erence aside, we can exploit our analysis in Section 3.1 to characterize trade
when the monopolist cannot o¤er unfavorable contracts. Speci…cally, in any semi-favorable
BPE, the monopolist must o¤er favorable contracts with probability  and default con-
tracts otherwise, charging  =  + 1¡ , where  2 [1¡2  1+2 ] and  ´
q
1¡ 4
¡ ; while
buyers must accept with probability ¡
¡ . As    in any semi-favorable BPE, the only
pertinent deviation for the monopolist is to o¤ering a simple contract, which yields the
same pro…t as in unregulated markets. Consequently, the arguments used to prove Propo-
sition 3.1 apply to this subsection’s model; and the conditions therein hold again, subject
16cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §208 Comment g and §211(3).
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to replacing  ´ 0 [resp. ] with   0 [resp. ], and replacing unfavorable with default
terms in any complex contract. (The probability that buyers read in a semi-favorable
equilibrium now depends on  plus the drafting cost.) Speci…cally:
Lemma 4 Generic mitigating regulation games have a unique outcome. Buyers expect to
earn 0 at this outcome, which is ine¢cient. The monopolist mixes between o¤ering
a default and a favorable contract, each priced at + ´  + 21¡ , if and only if
 ¡   4 and 2   ¡  or  ¡   (¡)
2
¡¡ . The monopolist otherwise o¤ers
a simple contract, priced at .
We omit the proof of Lemma 4 because it follows the same lines as the proof of Propo-
sition 3.1.17
Mitigating regulation a¤ects the existence of a semi-favorable equilibrium via buyers’
incentives to read and via the monopolist’s incentives to o¤er a default contract; and the
welfare e¤ects of mitigating regulation depend on whether a regulated and an unregulated
monopolist each o¤er favorable contracts in equilibrium. Mitigating regulation would
reduce pro…ts and welfare if an unregulated monopolist o¤ered an unfavorable contract
for sure (so this contract would have to be second best) and 2   ¡ , as a regulated
monopolist would then o¤er a simple contract.
Our main result in this part demonstrates that mitigating regulation can reduce wel-
fare, via its e¤ect on buyer incentives, when the unregulated game has a semi-favorable
equilibrium:
Proposition 3.3 (Mitigating regulation may reduce ex ante welfare) If
maxf4 (2 ¡ 2 + )
2
2 ¡ 2 +  ¡ g    4 + 
then the outcome in unregulated games Pareto dominates the outcome in mitigating
regulation games.
Proof The lower bound on  in the premise implies that an unregulated monopolist
o¤ers a favorable contract with positive probability, earning more than  ¡  (cf. Propo-
sition 3.1). The upper bound on  implies that  is unde…ned; so a regulated monopolist
o¤ers a simple contract, earning  ¡  (cf. Lemma 4). Buyers expect to earn 0 in both
regulated and unregulated markets, proving the result.¥
Unlike regulations which mandate favorable terms, mitigating regulations do not elim-
inate the monopolist’s commitment problem: she now has an incentive to o¤er default
terms in the hope that buyers will accept without reading. In particular, the monopolist
only o¤ers complex contracts in equilibrium if buyers have an incentive to read. For a …xed
reading cost, this incentive is generated by the utility di¤erence between the best and the
worst terms that a complex contract might contain in equilibrium. Mitigating regulation
17We obtain the conditions for a semi-favorable equilibrium from + ¡  ¡: the condition which
replaces b¡   2 ¡ 2 in mitigating regulation games.
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reduces this utility di¤erence. Consequently, the introduction of such regulations could
force the monopolist to o¤er simple contracts. We exploit this e¤ect in Proposition 3.3.
Proposition 3.3 states that mitigating regulation can reduce ex ante welfare. However,
if default terms are second best then A2 implies that replacing unfavorable terms in ac-
cepted contracts with default or favorable terms always increases welfare.18 This di¤erence
between ex ante and ex post welfare e¤ects restates why Proposition 3.3 seems so striking:
regulations which raise welfare in court reduce welfare ex ante. The intuition is that the
monopolist responds to regulations which prohibit unfavorable contracts by also no longer
o¤ering favorable contracts.
While mitigating regulation reduces buyers’ incentives to read, it also reduces the
monopolist’s incentives to deviate from a putative semi-favorable equilibrium: on the one
hand, the regulated monopolist earns more than her unregulated counterpart in putative
semi-favorable equilibria (because b  +); on the other hand, mitigating regulation may
reduce the pro…t earned by deviating to a second best contract. The monopolist would
o¤er complex contracts, whether regulated or unregulated, if the conditions in Proposition
3.3 were replaced by   maxf4 (¡)
2
¡¡g+. The outcome in the mitigating regulation
game then Pareto dominates that in an unregulated game: for    if both are well-
de…ned, which implies that b  +; so mitigating regulation then increases pro…t without
a¤ecting buyer payo¤s.
It is instructive to consider a particular policy application of our results. Engel and
McCoy (2002) argue that subprime lenders had monopoly power, which they exploited
to include unfavorable terms in complex mortgage contracts. Engel and McCoy argue in
favor of mitigating regulations, such as waiving legal redress. Our results suggest that
this regulation may reduce welfare by driving all complex contracts, including favorable
ones, from the market.19 In the next section, we will argue that the deleterious e¤ects
of mitigating regulation may be reinforced if some buyers are naively optimistic. This
supposition seems appropriate in the market for subprime mortgages as Bucks and Pence
(2008) show that mortgage borrowers held systematically optimistic beliefs about the terms
in their adjustable rate mortgages.20
4. Naive buyers
Thus far, we have focused on play when buyers are sophisticated. Court decisions and
the legal literature suggest that standard form contracts should be regulated in order
to protect naive buyers.21 In this section, we follow the recent literature by considering
the e¤ects of regulation when some buyers naively believe that all complex contracts are
favorable. Speci…cally, we suppose that the monopolist knows the proportion of naive
18By contrast, mandating favorable terms raises welfare both ex ante and ex post.
19J. Stevens articulated this justi…cation for Chapter 13 rules when concurring in Nobleman v. American
Savings Bank 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
20Armstrong and Vickers (2012) argue that UK consumers have been (on average) naively optimistic
about overdraft charges.
21Restatement (Second) of Contracts §211(c) states that a clause is unenforceable if a buyer would not
have traded had he known its contents.
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buyers (henceforth ) but cannot identify (and therefore directly target) them. In light of
the heterogeneity of buyers, we further amend the model by supposing that the monopolist
can o¤er a menu of contracts.
Naive buyers hold beliefs which are sometimes false; so we model them as dummy
players. Speci…cally, we compute naive buyers’ perceived utility for any menu of contracts,
and assume that they each choose best responses, given their beliefs. In particular, naive
buyers never read, and only accept the cheapest simple or the cheapest complex contract
on o¤er. If the cheapest simple and complex contracts are respectively priced at  and
 then naively optimistic buyers only accept the former if  ·  +minf ¡   0g, and
only accept the latter if  ·  +minf ¡  0g.
We refer to the other buyers as sophisticated. These buyers select one of the contracts
on o¤er, which they then accept, reject or read. If the monopolist o¤ers more than one
contract then sophisticated buyers’ beliefs about the terms in each complex contract on
o¤er may depend on the entire menu, rather than just on the price of that complex contract.
(We will exploit this feature below.)
Naive buyers value a complex contract at least as highly as sophisticated buyers. Conse-
quently, naive and sophisticated buyers cannot respectively accept a simple and a complex
contract in any BPE. Furthermore, there cannot be a BPE in which simple contracts are
traded at di¤erent prices, as no buyer would accept the more expensive of two contracts;
and there cannot be a BPE in which simple contracts alone are traded, as the monopolist
could pro…tably deviate to o¤ering an unfavorable contract which attracts naive buyers.
Finally, arguments used in the proof of Proposition 3.1 imply that sophisticated buyers
who accept a favorable contract must again mix between accepting and reading it: which
is again only possible in a BPE if  ¸ 4.
For current purposes, we need to use the weaker re…nement of an -equilibrium, which
we introduced in Section 2, focusing of course on play when  is small enough. We use an
online appendix to explain why unregulated games lack an equilibrium, as well as other
unproven claims in this section.22
If all buyers are naive then an unregulated monopolist o¤ers an unfavorable contract,
priced at  , in every BPE, and therefore every -equilibrium. The monopolist o¤ers a
favorable contract, priced at  under mandating regulation, and a default contract priced
at  under mitigating regulation. Hence, both regulations bene…t the naive buyers at the
expense of the monopolist. Mandating regulation always raises welfare, whereas mitigating
regulation raises welfare if and only if default terms are second best.
The analysis of games in which  2 (0 1) is more subtle because the monopolist can
use her menu to screen buyers. We focus on games in which few enough buyers are
naive, exploring when and how the naive buyers may be protected by their sophisticated
counterparts in unregulated markets, and how regulation a¤ects such protection.
We will adopt the following assumption - which imposes nontrivial restrictions on the
model’s parameters - throughout this section:
A3
a Default terms are second best;
b 2( ¡  + )  4    4 +   5;
22The appendix is available at www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/documents/eeronlineapp.pdf
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c   2 ¡ (1¡ )( ¡  +  );
d   minf( ¡ ) 2b b ¡  ¡ (1¡ )( ¡  +  )g.
As   4, A3c can only also be satis…ed if  is small enough;   4 and A3c
also imply that the right-hand side of the inequality in A3d is positive. The …rst two
inequalities in A3b imply that the conditions in the premise of Proposition 3.1 are satis…ed:
the equilibrium of an unregulated game with no naive buyers is semi-favorable.
A3 implies that an unregulated monopolist o¤ers complex contracts priced at  and at
 (where 0      b), earning less than
¤ ´ b ¡  ¡ (1¡ ) ,
the supremum across BPEs of the monopolist’s payo¤, in any -equilibrium. The cheaper
contract is unfavorable, and is accepted by naive buyers. The other contract is unfavorable
with probability , and is otherwise favorable, and is only accepted by sophisticated
buyers. Naive buyers’ payo¤ is negative because they pay a positive price for an unfavorable
contract. (See Claim in the online appendix.) The predicted separation is consistent with
Schwarcz’s (2011) evidence of segmentation in the market for home insurance.
While naive and sophisticated buyers accept di¤erent contracts, sophisticated buyers
protect naive buyers in these -equilibria. Speci…cally, naive buyers would be prepared
to pay up to  for complex contracts; but the monopolist charges them less because she
also wants to o¤er complex contracts to sophisticated buyers, who would reject complex
contracts priced above b. The monopolist must therefore charge naive buyers less than she
charges sophisticated buyers. Sophisticated buyers also protect (few enough) naive buyers
in Schwartz and Wilde (1983) and the ensuing literature. However, the e¤ect occurs there
because sellers cannot o¤er a menu of contracts which screens buyers.23
We now turn to the e¤ect of regulation on markets which contain naive buyers. Under
mandating regulation, the monopolist o¤ers a favorable contract, priced at  , resulting
in e¢cient trade. A3 implies that the regulated monopolist’s pro…t exceeds ¤: the upper
bound on her pro…ts when unregulated. Naive buyers also bene…t from mandating reg-
ulation because they then earn 0. These observations extend Proposition 3.2 (no naive
buyers).
Now suppose that the monopolist is prohibited from o¤ering unfavorable contracts. The
monopolist then o¤ers a simple contract priced at  and a default contract priced at  ,
which sophisticated and naive buyers respectively accept in every BPE: for   4 + 
(in A3b) implies that  is unde…ned, so sophisticated buyers cannot accept a complex
contract.
Naive buyers earn ¡ in every -equilibrium of the mitigating regulation game, and
earn more than ¡b in every -equilibrium of the unregulated game because   b. A3b
implies that   , and therefore that  ¡   ¡b; so mitigating regulation harms naive
buyers. In particular, naive buyers pay a higher price for a complex contract with better
terms in a regulated market. A3 implies that the former e¤ect dominates: few enough naive
buyers are harmed because sophisticated buyers no longer protect them under mitigating
regulation. By contrast, mitigating regulation bene…ts buyers if they are all naive.
23See, in particular, Armstrong and Vickers (2012).
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Now consider the menu which a regulated monopolist o¤ers in equilibrium. Sophis-
ticated [resp. naive] buyers would also have accepted a simple [resp. default] contract
priced at  [resp.  ] in an unregulated market; so mitigating regulation must harm the
monopolist. Finally, sophisticated buyers expect to earn about 0 in every -equilibrium,
irrespective of the legal regime. Consequently, mitigating regulation must reduce welfare,
even though default terms are second best (so this regulation would raise welfare when all
buyers are naive).
We summarize these arguments in:
Proposition 4.1 (The e¤ect of regulation with naive buyers) If A3 then
a Trade under mandating regulation is e¢cient. Mandating regulation bene…ts the
monopolist and naive buyers.
b Mitigating regulation harms naive buyers and the monopolist, and reduces welfare.
5. Conclusion
We have analyzed the e¤ect of regulations in a simple model of trade between a monopo-
list and sophisticated buyers. Mandating favorable terms unsurprisingly induces e¢cient
trade. However, identifying e¢cient terms may be more di¢cult for courts or regulators
than identifying terms which are manifestly ine¢cient. We show that an unregulated mo-
nopolist may o¤er a contract containing the latter terms; so mitigating regulation may
a¤ect trade. Our main results demonstrate that this e¤ect may reduce welfare.
We have extended our main model to incorporate naive buyers, demonstrating that our
results carry over to such settings. Indeed, the presence of naive buyers could reinforce the
(potentially) deleterious e¤ects of mitigating regulation by removing the protection that
sophisticated buyers provide in an unregulated monopoly.
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APPENDIX (PROOFS)
Lemma 2
a The monopolist does not o¤er a (complex) default contract in any BPE.
b Any BPE in which the monopolist o¤ers a favorable contract with positive probability
has the following properties: the monopolist also o¤ers an unfavorable contract at the
same price as the favorable contract with positive probability; and buyers mix between
accepting and reading a complex contract at that price, only accepting after reading
favorable terms in the latter case.
Proof
a Suppose, per contra, that the monopolist o¤ered f g. There are two cases to
consider. If a buyer would reject after reading f g then he would also reject after reading
f g, so the monopolist would be indi¤erent between the two contracts in the event that
the buyer read. As the buyer accepts with positive probability, the monopolist would
prefer to o¤er f g. Now suppose that a buyer would accept with positive probability
after reading f g. The price could then not exceed , in which case the monopolist
could economize on the drafting cost by o¤ering a simple contract, priced at . In sum,
the monopolist cannot o¤er a default contract in any BPE.
b A2 implies that the monopolist can earn positive pro…ts by o¤ering a second best
contract. Consequently, buyers must accept any complex contract that the monopolist
o¤ers with positive probability (possibly after reading) in any BPE.
Suppose that the monopolist o¤ers a favorable contract in a BPE. If buyers never read
then the monopolist could pro…tably deviate to o¤ering an unfavorable contract at the
same price. A buyer who reads must accept a favorable contract and reject a contract
which contains some other terms, else he could pro…tably deviate to not reading. Finally,
buyers must sometimes accept without reading: for A2 would otherwise imply that the
monopolist would o¤er a favorable contract for sure, in which case buyers could pro…tably
deviate to not reading, as they could infer terms from the price. Hence, a monopolist who
o¤ers a favorable contract, priced at , must o¤er another complex contract priced at 
with positive probability. Part a above implies that this contract must be unfavorable.¥
Proposition 3.1 (Unregulated games)
Generic unregulated games have a unique equilibrium outcome, which is ine¢cient, and
at which buyers expect to earn 0. The monopolist mixes between o¤ering an unfavorable
and a favorable contract, each priced at b, if and only if   4 and
2  2 ¡ 2 +  or   (2 ¡ 2 + )
2
2 ¡ 2 +  ¡  . (1)
The monopolist otherwise o¤ers a second best contract, priced at 2.
Proof Lemma 1 immediately implies that every equilibrium must be ine¢cient. We
will prove the other claims in the Proposition using the following steps. We start by proving
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existence of and characterizing second best BPEs, arguing that every BPE is either second
best or semi-favorable. We then prove existence of a semi-favorable BPE in which the
monopolist charges b if and only if the conditions in the premise hold. We end the proof
by applying our re…nement to the set of BPEs.
Step 1 The second best BPE outcome
The following strategy combination and beliefs form a BPE.
The monopolist o¤ers a second best contract, priced at 2. Buyers accept
a simple [resp. complex] contract priced no higher than  [resp. 0], believing
that any complex contract is unfavorable. After reading a complex contract
which contains terms  and is priced at , buyers accept if and only if  ¸ .
A2 implies that the monopolist cannot pro…tably deviate to o¤ering either any other
complex contract or any simple contract at another price. Buyers’ beliefs are sequentially
rational.
Lemma 2 implies that the monopolist must o¤er the unfavorable contract for sure in
any complex BPE which is not semi-favorable. The monopolist must o¤er the second best
contract, priced at 2, in any BPE which is not semi-favorable, as she could otherwise
pro…tably deviate to o¤ering that contract.
Buyer beliefs about the terms in complex contracts may di¤er across second best BPEs;
but generic games (where ¡ 6= ¡) have a unique second best BPE outcome, in which
buyers earn 0.
Step 2 Semi-favorable BPE outcomes
Suppose that   4 and (1). We claim that the following strategy combination and
beliefs form a semi-favorable BPE:
The monopolist o¤ers fb g with probability 1+
2
, and otherwise o¤ers
fb g. After reading contract f g, buyers accept if and only if  ¸ .
Buyers believe that a complex contract priced at b is favorable with probability
1+
2
, and is otherwise unfavorable. They accept a complex contract priced
at b with probability ¡
¡ and read otherwise, accepting if and only if the
terms are favorable. Buyers believe that any complex contract priced at  6= b
is unfavorable. They accept such a contract without reading if  · 0, and
otherwise reject. Buyers accept a simple contract if and only if its price does
not exceed .
  4 implies that  and b are well-de…ned. Note, for future reference, that 1¡2 =  .
Buyer beliefs are sequentially rational. Buyers expect to earn 1+
2
 ¡ b if they accept
a complex contract, priced at b, and expect to earn 1+
2
( ¡ b) ¡  if they read that
contract; so the de…nition of b implies that they are indi¤erent. It is easy to con…rm that
their expected payo¤ is 0. (1) implies that b   ; so A1 implies that ¡¡ 2 (0 1). (1) also
implies that b  : so buyers cannot pro…tably deviate to accepting a default contract,
priced at b after reading. Conditional on their beliefs, buyers can therefore not pro…tably
deviate.
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Given buyer strategies, the monopolist earns b¡  if she o¤ers either fb g or fb g,
and cannot pro…tably deviate to o¤ering fb g. By de…nition of  , 1+
2
2 (0 1).
As b   , the monopolist cannot pro…tably deviate to o¤ering a contract which buyers
would reject.
Buyers accept complex contracts priced at  6= b if and only if  · 0; so the monopolist
would earn no more than ¡ by o¤ering a complex contract which buyers accept. Fur-
thermore, the monopolist would earn no more than  ¡  by o¤ering a simple contract.
Consequently, the monopolist cannot pro…tably deviate to o¤ering an accepted contract if
and only if b ¡   2 ¡ 2 (2)
Substituting for b and rearranging: (1) and (2) are equivalent.
In sum, the monopolist cannot pro…tably deviate; so the speci…ed strategy combination
and beliefs form a BPE.
Inspection of the arguments above reveals that, if (2) holds, then there are also semi-
favorable BPEs in which the monopolist o¤ers f g with probability  and f g
otherwise, for some  2 (  b). The monopolist earns ¡ in any such BPE. Consequently,
such BPEs only exist if there is a semi-favorable BPE in which the monopolist charges b,
and the monopolist earns most in the BPE where she charges b.
We now argue that   4 and (1) are necessary for a semi-favorable BPE to exist.
Lemma 2 implies that, in any semi-favorable BPE: the monopolist o¤ers f g with prob-
ability (say)  and f g otherwise, and that buyers mix between accepting and reading
a complex contract priced at . Buyers can only be indi¤erent between accepting and
reading if  = 
1¡ , in which case they prefer not to reject if and only if 
2¡ + · 0.
This condition is only consistent with  2 (0 1) if   4. Next, observe that the monop-
olist earns ¡  in any semi-favorable BPE where she charges . As  = 1¡ and buyers
cannot prefer to reject in any semi-favorable BPE, the monopolist cannot earn more thanb ¡  in any such BPE. The monopolist would earn up to 2 ¡ 2 by o¤ering the second
best contract in any BPE. As (1) and (2) are equivalent, the monopolist could pro…tably
deviate to o¤ering a second best contract if (1) failed.
Step 3 Selecting equilibrium outcomes
We now consider which BPEs satisfy our re…nement.
Suppose, …rst, that   4 and (1) holds. The monopolist is then better o¤ in the
BPEs where she charges b than in any other semi-favorable BPE, and than in the second
best BPEs (by (2)). This allows us to de…ne the -commitment type (for  small enough)
in perturbed games ( ) as a monopolist who o¤ers fb g with probability b and
fb g otherwise: where b ´ b ¡  and 0    b ¡  ¡ (2 ¡ 2): so the monopolist
charges b in a semi-favorable BPE of the original game, . We …rst demonstrate that
( ) has no BPE in which the monopolist o¤ers a second best contract:
Buyers and the (normal type of) monopolist respectively earn 0 and 2¡2 in any second
best BPE; so buyers would not reject a complex contract priced at b  b. Accordingly,
suppose that the normal type deviated to o¤ering fb g. Buyers would accept, possibly
after reading, and the monopolist would earn b ¡  . This deviation is pro…table becauseb ¡   2 ¡ 2. Hence, no BPE of ( ) prescribes the normal type to o¤er a second
best contract when  is small enough; so  does not have a second best equilibrium.
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We now argue that  has a semi-favorable equilibrium. Consider a strategy combina-
tion in ( ) where the normal and the -commitment type pool: both o¤ering contracts
priced at b. The normal type cannot pro…tably deviate to o¤ering either a simple contract
or a complex contract priced at  6= b if buyers believe that such a contract is unfavor-
able. Arguments used in Step 2 above also imply that buyers cannot pro…tably deviate.
Consequently, ( ) has a BPE in which the monopolist mixes between o¤ering fb g
and fb g. Taking limits as  and  each approach 0 (and therefore as b ! b),  has a
semi-favorable equilibrium in which the monopolist charges b.
If   4 or (1) fails then every BPE is second best. Accordingly, the monopolist’s
-commitment type in ( ) o¤ers a second best contract, priced at 2. By construction,
the -commitment type o¤ers the same contract in ( ) as the monopolist o¤ers in the
second best BPE in . Buyers may then infer (in ( )) that any complex contract that
the monopolist o¤ers is unfavorable. The monopolist then has no pro…table deviation in
( ) from o¤ering a second best contract priced at 2; and buyers cannot pro…tably
deviate (cf. Step 1). Consequently, this is the only outcome in .¥
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